In chapters three and four of A Brief History of Ethics, Alastair MacIntyre makes a clear distinction between two philosophical doctrines at loggerheads: the Sophists and Socrates. The sophistical amalgamation of personal success, lust and power is constantly interrogated by an interlocutor in a never-ending situation to reveal sophistical ignorance, fruitless desires and the right to universal justice. MacIntyre identifies the codes of both parties and complements the debate with historical examples to conclude the social success (or lack thereof) and persuasion on both sides. MacIntyre begins by describing the general amalgam of sophistic theory: success. The areté (virtue) of a sophist is to become a prosperous citizen by conforming to the social convention of justice (14). Using Théatet's dialogue, he reveals Protagoras' doctrine as the link between relativism and knowledge: "as things seem to an individual observer, such as they are" (15). The truth is discovered from a personal perspective and therefore it was necessary to adhere to public conventions in order to succeed. However, MacIntyre questions this view of "personal realism" because it defeats the purpose of the fallacy; if all ideas are equal in relation to truth, then the superiority of truth is indefinite. Unfortunately, social conventions vary from state to state. What a sophist should pay attention to in one state may be completely different in another. MacIntyre thus exposes the first flaw of the fallacy: an individual has not received a guide to the social conventions of a city-state, and must therefore adapt to the criteria of each state (16). Questions of social action and life must be defined as non-moral or pre-moral; a tool called a natural man...... middle of paper ...... firmly believes that good and bad cannot be synonyms for pleasant and painful, but rather adjectives to evaluate the extent of pleasure and pain (30). This therefore reinforces the requirement of limited desire since desire itself can only be defined by assessing the extent to which one wants the desire. MacIntyre ends by evaluating the concept of good according to a desire and a goal. Without a goal, no limits can be set and therefore there will never be satisfaction. And when man does not know what a satisfying desire can be, then there is no guarantee of realizing that desire. If an object is to be good, Socrates justifies that it must be defined by your own rules of a good desire. The Sophists' intention to destroy universal truth, make desire limitless, and persuade only for the sake of power promises a truly unintelligible and lost individual..