A preference theory is a philosophical theory according to which the satisfaction of preferences is the only thing that matters in contributing to well-being. Well-being can be thought of as what people ultimately want to achieve; the “ultimate good”1. In terms of preference theory, for you to achieve the state of well-being, then you must satisfy your preferences. Theories of preferences can be divided into two distinct categories: the theory of real preferences and the theory of ideal preferences2. Real preference theory deals with preferences that people actually have, regardless of misinformation or irrationality, while ideal preference theory is concerned with what we would “hypothetically” prefer, if we were completely informed and rational3 . In this essay, I will argue against the view of well-being that current preference theory posits, and attempt to prove it incorrect by showing that the satisfaction of preferences does not always have well-being-promoting consequences. , and therefore the current preference theory of well-being is ultimately false. Current preference theory asserts that well-being can be produced by satisfying your preferences. So, if your preference is satisfied, you are inevitably better off, because through the fulfillment of your preference you experience well-being. So it seems undeniable to say that, according to preference theory, you should feel well-being if your preference is satisfied. However, this view of well-being appears to have a serious flaw. If an agent is not aware of the realization of his preference, does he still experience well-being? Logic and rationality should tell us no, but current preference theory seems to disagree with this statement, and I...... middle of article...... the concept of well-being . Overall, the combination of inconsistencies and errors that I have attempted to highlight in my arguments prove, I think, my initial hypothesis that current preference theory does not offer a correct explanation of the good. -being, because the arguments show that the realization of a preference does not provide a correct explanation of well-being. do not always produce consequences conducive to well-being. Number of words: 2134References1. Crisp, Roger, "Well-Being", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2013 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .2. Kagan, Shelly. 1998. “The Good” in normative ethics. Oxford: Westview Press3. Feldman, Fred. 2004. “The quest for the good life” in Pleasure and the Good Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press