Question: Why do states go to war? School 1: States that want to gain more power use war as a means to gain more power or maintain power in an anarchic world. Evera, S. V. (1998). Attack, defense and causes of war. International Security, 4(22), 5-43. Retrieved from http://www.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.1/Van%20Evera%20IS%201998.pdf According to Evera, a state is more likely to engage in war if it has the upper hand between States if he initiates war. (Evera 5) There are several reasons why a state would consider going to war according to Evera, they look at the decision making of the state. The state will go to war if it manages to gain advantage in a war. According to Evera, offensive and defensive balance have their own advantages when used in the right situation. (Evera p16-18) If a shift between offensive and defensive balance occurs between states, there is a high risk of war according to Evera. (Evera p6). The problem that might be overlooked is that realism in this case views the state only as a unitary actor. It is difficult to look at the state as a whole to determine what it is thinking when it goes to war, because it does not take into account the different levels of analysis within the government. According to him, the state wants only a few things, namely power and security. Realism is the main idea behind this article, as it views the state as a rational actor and only examines states that seek to engage in war and the reasons why they do so. Glaser, C.L. (1997). The security dilemma revisited. Cambridge University Press, 50(1), 171-201. Retrieved from http://www.gwu.edu/~iscs/assets/docs/cg-docs/SecurityDilemma-WP-1997.pdfGlasser sees a dist...... middle of paper ......h goes to war. Leaders did not take into account the cost of war. They tend to consider the risk of war and try to find an advantage in going to war. (Fearon 379-380). Fearon points out that leaders could negotiate and avoid war in general, but they tend to overlook the cost of life of those at war. (Fearon 381). Fearon argues that bluffing for leaders helps a state hide its weakness and show its strength in front of different states. (Fear 397). Rational choice is clearly the route Fearon takes in his article, as he shows how leaders would make choices that would decide whether their state would go to war or not, based on several factors. The one thing that rational actors always assume, but cannot prove, is trying to show that all actors are rational thinkers. Leaders who go to war might not think rationally when deciding whether to settle or go to war. .