Case Study: Sayano Shushenskaya Hydroelectric Power PlantIntroduction:Located on the Yenisei River, closest to Sayanogorsk in Khakassia, Russia, the Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydroelectric Power Plant Soviet-era Shushenskaya was opened in 1978. In 2009, the plant was ranked sixth in the world and first in Russia for gross hydroelectric power production. In total, ten turbines were used to provide 6,400 MW of electricity to Russian infrastructure.1When workers arrived at the factory around 8:00 a.m. on August 17, 2009, there was no cause for immediate alarm . Of the ten turbines, nine of them were operating and a tenth was down for routine maintenance. However, turbine two caused significant vibration because its load varied depending on electricity demand. At 8:13 a.m., the vibrations of the turbine bearing reached a maximum and caused a catastrophic failure. The turbine cover lifted when the 1,000 t rotor separated from its seat. The newly created hole in the structure allowed water to surge at a rate of 67,600 gal s-1 into the engine room and flood the lower levels.2 The massive jet of water tore apart the metal joists which supported the roof above turbine one, two and three. As the roof collapsed, water continued to flood the factory. Long after the automatic safety system should have been triggered, turbines seven and nine were still operating at full capacity, causing what were observed as large explosions nearby as floodwaters reached their control panels. Fortunately, at 9:20 a.m., the 170 t of steel water inlet doors of each turbine were closed manually using relief valves on the hydraulic support ram of each door. At 11:32 a.m., a diesel generator was installed to restore power to the area. Later, at 11:50 a.m., 11 spillway gates were opened to discharge the excess...... middle of paper ......ing is also taught here, as the factory workers had never carried out emergency drills and no A backup generator was installed to power the plant itself in the event of an emergency. However, much of the reason for turbine two's failure lies in human hands. Maintenance and inspection personnel clearly knew that the intense vibrations were not normal, but the turbine was used anyway. This could also have fallen to management, as they should have ensured that maintenance guidelines were followed. In this regard, it should be noted that, immediately after the explosions, while many people were fleeing, several supervisors responsible for security and emergencies also fled. Ultimately, it was an entirely preventable disaster, caused by human negligence, exacerbated by mechanical fatigue, and ended with lessons learned at a high price.