Modern feminists might gasp if I assert that patriarchy once allowed for efficient economic organization, but the tools of modern political economy uncover the mystery of why unequal gender norms were once economically efficient. Changing modes of production and material constraints require an efficient division of labor guided by socialized gender norms that adapt to macroeconomic conditions. Gary Becker and Torben Iversen understand the economic division of labor differently based on their different historical and material conditions. In his “Time Allocation Theory,” Becker models an ideal economic division of labor with the household as a single entity seeking maximum utility. Men specialize in marketable skills because of a comparative advantage in heavy work; women specialize in general housekeeping skills and motherhood. Iversen's concept of an efficient division of labor does not view the household as a single entity but rather views the individual as the basic economic unit, resulting in less sexist social norms. Thus, as society evolves from agricultural to industrial, then post-industrial, modes of production, gender norms adapt to the needs of society and aim to achieve an efficient division of labor. When material macroeconomic conditions improve, households restructure gender norms and behaviors in response to the demand for a more efficient division of labor. In this article, I argue that changing modes of production alter power dynamics in family negotiations, forcing gender norms to conform to market demands for a revised division of labor. To support my claim that modes of production alter gender power dynamics to conform to market demands for efficient division of labor, I first define "modes of production" and discuss their end. .... middle of article ...... motivation or sudden sectoral changes necessitated by historical circumstances impose a revision of gender norms. Empirical evidence further suggests that gender norms are the product of advances in modes of production that enable an economically efficient division of labor. Works Cited Becker, Gary. “A theory of the distribution of time.” The Economic Journal 75, no. 229 (1965). 493-517. Accessed April 17, 2014. Clayton-Dye, Amanda. “The political economy of gender.” Lectures at the University of Washington, Seattle, April 8, 2014. Iversen, Torben and Frances Rosenbluth. Women, work and power: the political economy of gender inequality. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010. Kindle eBook. Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 4th edition. Edited by RH Campbell and AS Skinner. 1776. Reprint, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.

Essay / Modern feminists might gasp if I assert that patriarchy once allowed for efficient economic organization, but the tools of modern political economy uncover the mystery of why unequal gender norms were once economically efficient. Changing modes of production and material constraints require an efficient division of labor guided by socialized gender norms that adapt to macroeconomic conditions. Gary Becker and Torben Iversen understand the economic division of labor differently based on their different historical and material conditions. In his “Time Allocation Theory,” Becker models an ideal economic division of labor with the household as a single entity seeking maximum utility. Men specialize in marketable skills because of a comparative advantage in heavy work; women specialize in general housekeeping skills and motherhood. Iversen's concept of an efficient division of labor does not view the household as a single entity but rather views the individual as the basic economic unit, resulting in less sexist social norms. Thus, as society evolves from agricultural to industrial, then post-industrial, modes of production, gender norms adapt to the needs of society and aim to achieve an efficient division of labor. When material macroeconomic conditions improve, households restructure gender norms and behaviors in response to the demand for a more efficient division of labor. In this article, I argue that changing modes of production alter power dynamics in family negotiations, forcing gender norms to conform to market demands for a revised division of labor. To support my claim that modes of production alter gender power dynamics to conform to market demands for efficient division of labor, I first define "modes of production" and discuss their end. .... middle of article ...... motivation or sudden sectoral changes necessitated by historical circumstances impose a revision of gender norms. Empirical evidence further suggests that gender norms are the product of advances in modes of production that enable an economically efficient division of labor. Works Cited Becker, Gary. “A theory of the distribution of time.” The Economic Journal 75, no. 229 (1965). 493-517. Accessed April 17, 2014. Clayton-Dye, Amanda. “The political economy of gender.” Lectures at the University of Washington, Seattle, April 8, 2014. Iversen, Torben and Frances Rosenbluth. Women, work and power: the political economy of gender inequality. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010. Kindle eBook. Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 4th edition. Edited by RH Campbell and AS Skinner. 1776. Reprint, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.

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