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Essay / Why causal connections do not solve the Gettier problem
The aim of this article is to show that Goldman's causal theory of knowledge does not solve the Gettier problem. First, I'll reiterate the Gettier problem. Second, I will show how Goldman's theory attempts to solve the Gettier problem. Next, I will show how overdetermination reveals a major flaw in Goldman's theory. Finally, I will demonstrate that Goldman's theory does not work if the world we live in is not a world of absolute truth and devoid of deception. First, when we look at causal chain theory, it is imperative that we understand the basis of what it is trying to do. which amounts to trying to solve the Gettier problem. So, in order to continue building my argument, I will briefly address what the said problem was with the aim of showing how the causal theory of knowledge fails to resolve the problem proposed by Gettier. In short: the Gettier problem emphasized that knowledge requires more than justified true belief. An example provided by Gettier is where a man: Smith, is told by a potential employer that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, Smith is then right to believe that Johnson: another man who has spent a interview for the position same position, he will be the one who gets the job since Smith knows without a doubt that Johnson has 10 coins in his pocket. However, Smith ended up getting the job because, unknowingly, he also had ten coins in his pocket. Smith was correct in believing that the man with ten coins in his pocket would get the job, but we cannot say that Smith actually had knowledge based on this account because he incorrectly assumed that Johnson would get the job. Therefore, Gettier said that there must be more to knowledge than justified true beliefs. Then......middle of the article......Hain would solve the Gettier problem. At this point in Goldman's article, he begins to examine knowledge. through testimony declaring: “This too can be analyzed causally. p causes a person T to believe p, by perception. T's belief in p gives rise to (causes) his assertion of p. T's assertion of p leads S, by auditory perception, to believe that T asserts p. S infers that T believes p, and from there he infers that p is a fact. "which simply means that p causes T to believe it and that T expressing this belief in front of S leads S to believe that p must be a fact. After stating this, Goldman points out that if miscommunication is involved in some way or another in this transaction, such as accidentally dropping the "no" when referring to p in a newspaper article, then S will not have the correct causal chain leading to his belief, so he I do not have of knowledge about p.